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Summary
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each
choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of
public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of
the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the
minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two
principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to
exist.
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In this note we consider a model of jurisdiction formation, where the entire pop-
ulation has to be partitioned into several jurisdictions, each deciding on the public
project from the multi-dimensional characteristics set. Whereas the existing litera-
ture deals with uni-dimensional universe of public projects, in this note we consider
a set of projects to be imbedded in the set of an arbitrary dimension. Agents are
assumed to have Euclidean preferences over possible project locations, and, thus, can
be identiﬁed by their peaks (best preferred locations) in the multi-dimensional space.
When a jurisdiction is formed and a public project is selected, the jurisdiction must
choose the way to distribute the project cost among its members. The discussion on
the cost sharing methods in this context has progressed in two directions. One group
of papers (Le Breton and Weber (2003), (2004), Haimanko et al. (2004a), Le Breton et
al. (2004)) assumes the transferable utility framework with the unrestricted set of re-
distribution schemes within a jurisdiction. However, in many situations the degree of
freedom in selecting a taxation scheme and degree of compensation to disadvantaged
agents could be limited by customs, law, feasibility or variety of other constraints.
Thus, a large number of papers (Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Casella (2001), J´ ehiel
and Scotchmer (2001), Haimanko et al. (2004b)) consider an equal share taxation
scheme where all members of jurisdiction make an equal monetary contribution to-
wards the projects costs. This cost sharing mechanism has some appealing properties,
such as simplicity and anonymity. However, it rules out any degree of equalization
between agents who enjoy vastly diﬀerent beneﬁts from the public project.
In this note we consider the case where every jurisdiction applies egalitarian rule
of full equalization, when the total burden of taxation cost and disutility from having
a project diﬀerent from agent’s ideal choice is equally divided among the members
of the jurisdiction. The egalitarian rule in this context implements the Rawlsian
principle by equalizing the total costs of all agents and, therefore, minimizing the
total cost of the most disadvantaged agent. Under the egalitarian rule agents are not
hold accountable for their preferences and the burden of total disutility is shifted to
the entire jurisdiction.
The equal burden of all agents within every jurisdiction turns our model into
2hedonic game (Banerjee et al. (2001), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)), where
once a coalition is formed, one can uniquely determine the (equal) payoﬀ of all of
its members. Thus, agents form well-deﬁned preferences over possible coalitions they
could join. This feature of the hedonic model allows us to consider not only traditional
cooperative stability notions (like core), but also non-cooperative stability, when only
one agent can migrate to another jurisdiction or create a new one. We show that
whereas the core stable partitions always exist in our multi-dimensional framework,
Nash stable partition may fail to exist even in the case where the set of projects is
represented by a uni-dimensional space.
2 The Model
We consider a ﬁnite society N = {1,...,n} of agents. The set of public projects
is given by the compact subset I of k-dimensional Euclidean space <k. Each agent
has Euclidean preferences over I, which allows us to identify an agent i with his/her
ideal point pi ∈ I. Slightly abusing the terminology, we will refer to pi as the location
of the agent i.
The society faces a task of partitioning itself into disjoint jurisdictions, where each
jurisdiction selects a location of the public project and a taxation scheme to ﬁnance
it. We assume voluntary participation: the beneﬁts from public projects exceed their
costs. When the location of the project p and a taxation scheme within jurisdiction
S are chosen, every member i of S incurs two types of cost: transportation cost from
his/her location at pi to p and the monetary contribution towards provision of the
public project.
The locational and redistributional choices within each jurisdiction are guided by
two principles, egalitarianism and eﬃciency. The egalitarian principle demands the
equality of the total cost (transportation and project contribution) for all agents in the
same jurisdiction. This requirement does, in fact, generate the Rawlsian allocation
(see Le Breton et al. (2004)), that minimizes the total cost of the most disadvan-
taged agent within the jurisdiction. The eﬃciency requires the minimization of the
aggregate total cost incurred by the members of the jurisdiction.
We assume that the cost of a public project in jurisdiction S is given by the
3positive value g(S), which may depend on the size and composition of a jurisdiction.
The taxation scheme x : S → < assigns the contribution x(i) for each agent i ∈ S.
The only requirement is that the allocation x must satisfy the budget constraint:
P
i∈S x(i) = g(S). In addition to the monetary contribution x(i), each member of
S incurs disutility, or transportation cost, d(||pi − p||), where p is the jurisdictional
choice of the public project. We assume that function d is continuous and increasing
on < with d(0) = 0.
Given the location p of the public project, the aggregate cost of members of
jurisdiction S will be the sum of the cost of the public project g(S) and the aggregate















and the location p(S) (not necessarily uniquely deﬁned) is determined by D(S,p(S)) =
D(S).
Under the egalitarian taxation scheme, all members of S equally share the aggre-
gated total cost (tax plus transportation cost) g(S) + D(S). Thus, every member i





where |S| is the cardinality of jurisdiction S. Given that i’s transportation cost is









Eﬃciency and egalitarianism completely determine the choices for each potential
jurisdiction. Thus, these requirements lead to hedonic cooperative coalition formation
game, where once a jurisdiction is formed, the payoﬀ or cost for each its member is
uniquely determined. We will examine the existence of stable partitions in our hedonic
4game, where all jurisdictions adopt the egalitarian rule. We consider two notions of
stability, where the ﬁrst is the standard notion of the core of the coalition structure
(Aumann and Dr` eze (1974)):
Deﬁnition 1: Let π = {S1,...,SK} be a jurisdictional structure. We say that a
jurisdiction S ⊂ N blocks π if c(Si) > c(S) for all i ∈ S, where Si is the
jurisdiction in π that contains i.
A jurisdictional structure π is called core-stable if no jurisdiction blocks π.
The second deﬁnition is that of Nash stability:
Deﬁnition 2: A jurisdictional structure π = {Sk}k=1,...,K is Nash stable if
c(S
i) ≤ g({i}) and c(S
i) ≤ c(Sk t {i})
for for every i ∈ S and every Sk ∈ π.
One can view a Nash stable jurisdictional structure as a free mobility equilibrium:
no agent has an incentive to move from his/her current jurisdiction to either “empty”
jurisdiction or to another existing jurisdiction. Note also that the set of Nash stable
jurisdictional structures is the set of pure Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game,
where each agent announces his/her “address” and all agents with the same address
form a jurisdiction.
While the deﬁnition of Nash stability allows only for deviations by a single agent,
an agent can move to a jurisdiction without the consent of its members. Thus, some
or even all members of that jurisdiction could be worse oﬀ. This observation shows
that there is no logical connection between the notions of core- and Nash stability.
And, indeed, the next section indicates sharply diﬀerent stability implications with
regard to these two notions.
3 The Results
In the egalitarian game, all members of the same coalition bear the same total cost
(or total disutility). Thus, each coalition S is assigned a number c(S) that represents
5the total cost of each of its members. Thus, all agents derive their preferences over
coalitions from the common ordering by comparing jurisdictions on the basis of their
assigned contributions. In hedonic games, such common ordering guarantees the
existence of a stable partition. Our ﬁrst proposition indeed states that, without any
further qualiﬁcation, stable jurisdictional structures always exist in the egalitarian
game.
Proposition 1: The Egalitarian game always admits core-stable jurisdictional struc-
tures.
Proof1: Let us construct the partition π as follows. Take a coalition T 1 that mini-





(obviously, the choice of T 1 as well as of all subsequent elements of π is not necessarily
unique.)
If T 1 = N, we are done. Otherwise, choose T 2 ⊂ N \T 1 to minimize the cost over




If T 1 tT 2 = N, we are done. Otherwise, choose T 3 ⊂ N \(T 1 tT 2)) to minimize





By continuing this process, after at most n iterations, we obtain a partition π =
{T 1,...,T K} of N. We show that π is stable. Indeed, consider an arbitrary coalition
T ⊂ N, and let T k be the ﬁrst coalition in π that has a nonempty intersection with
T, i.e., k = min{j|T j T
T 6= ∅}. Then the choice of T k implies that c(T k) ≤ c(T).
Thus, no agent that belongs to both T k and T, is better oﬀ at T as compared to T k,
which means that T could not block π.
1Since the egalitarian game satisﬁes the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer
(1988), our result could be derived from theirs. However, we opted to oﬀer a direct proof that also
implies that if all values c(S) are diﬀerent, the core-stable partition is unique.
6It is worthwhile pointing out that if all values c(S) are diﬀerent, our construction
yields a unique outcome π. It is easy to demonstrate that π is the unique core stable
partition. Indeed, T 1 has to be a part of every stable partition, otherwise this very
coalition will block the latter one; given that, T 2 must belong to it as well. By
extending the argument, we obtain the uniqueness of the core stable partition in this
case.
While we can guarantee core stability in the egalitarian game, such general state-
ment does not hold for Nash stability:
Proposition 2: Under the Egalitarian rule a Nash stable jurisdictional structure
may fail to exist even if the public project space is uni-dimensional.
Proof: Let space of public projects I be given by the uni-dimensional interval [0,4.1]
and consider a society with six agents, located at points p1 = 0, p2 = p3 = 1.9,
p4 = p5 = p6 = 4.1. Let transportation costs be linear, i.e., d(|p,p0|) = |p − p0| for all
p,p0 ∈ I, and project costs g(S) be equal to 1 for all jurisdictions S. We will show
that under the Egalitarian rule, this society does not admit a Nash stable partition.
Suppose, in negation, that π is a Nash stable partition. Denote T = {4,5,6}. It is
easy to verify that if there is S ∈ π that contains one or two agents from T in addition
to some of agents 1,2,3, then c(S) > 1. Thus, if agents 4,5,6 are separated in at
least two groups, they cannot be joined by other agents, implying that the members
of T should belong to the same jurisdiction in a Nash stable partition.
Since the members’ cost exceeds 1 in every jurisdiction with more than four mem-
bers, and agent 1 contributes strictly more than one in all multi-agent coalitions,
except {1,2,3}, it follows that only candidates for Nash stable jurisdiction structures
are:
{{1,2,3},T}, {{1},{2},{3} t T}, {{1},{3},{2} t T}, {{1},{2,3},T}.
Consider the following cycle:
{{1,2,3},T} → {{1,2},{3}tT} → {{1},{2},{3}tT} → {{1},{2,3},T} → {{1,2,3},T},
in which every partition is being obtained from the previous one by a shift of one
of the dissatisﬁed agents to a jurisdiction that yields his/her a lower cost. Thus, no
partition in the cycle is Nash stable, and due to a symmetry between agents 2 and 3,
it rules out all candidates to constitute a Nash stable partition. 
7To conclude, let us notice that the only core-stable partition in this example is
{{1},{2,3},T}.
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